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Supreme Court Determines No Private Right of Action Under Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940

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On June 11, 2026, the Supreme Court held that Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act does not give private parties a right to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act. FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U.S. ___, No. 24-345 (June 11, 2026). Justice Barrett wrote for a six-Justice majority; Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor and in part by Justice Kagan, who also filed separately. The decision resolves a circuit split, ends the principal federal theory activist investors had used against closed-end funds, and places the Securities and Exchange Commission at the center of Investment Company Act enforcement.

What Saba argued and why the theory mattered

Saba Capital invests by acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds and pressing them to change strategy or convert to open-end form. The funds it sued are Maryland corporations that had opted into the Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act, which strips voting rights from shares held above a threshold unless other shareholders approve. Saba argued those opt-in resolutions violated Section 18(i) of the Act, which requires that every share be voting stock with equal voting rights, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (2018), and that Section 47(b) let it sue in federal court to rescind them.

The theory worked below. The Southern District of New York ordered rescission and the Second Circuit affirmed, both relying on Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019). The Third and Ninth Circuits had gone the other way. Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co. (U.S.A.), 677 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2012); UFCW Local 1500 Pension Fund v. Mayer, 895 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2018).

The Court read Section 47(b) as an instruction to courts, not a grant to litigants

Section 47(b)(2) provides that where a contract made in violation of the Act has been performed, “a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party” unless denial would produce a more equitable result. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(2) (2018). The majority held the provision contains no rights-creating language. Its subject is a court, and it constrains how a court exercises remedial power once parties are before it. In the Court’s words, the section “presupposes that parties are already before the court” and “says not a word about individual rights.”

Structure pointed the same way. The Act designates the Commission as its enforcer, and Congress wrote two private rights of action into the statute expressly — Section 36(b) for breach of fiduciary duty as to adviser compensation, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2018), and Section 30(h), which incorporates the short-swing profit remedy of Exchange Act Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(h) (2018). Section 36(b) even assigns burdens of proof, caps damages, and names a forum. When Congress meant to create a private remedy under this Act, it drafted like a legislature creating one.

The Court also confined Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), which found an implied right to void advisory contracts under the Investment Advisers Act. Congress amended Section 47(b) in 1980 and deleted the “shall be void” language on which Transamerica turned, while leaving that phrase in place in Section 47(a) and in the Advisers Act. Changed language means changed meaning. The majority added that Transamerica had blessed only a limited remedy to void an advisory contract, not a general power to rescind any contract violating a securities statute.

What survives, and what does not

Federal rescission suits resting on Section 47(b) alone are over. Challenges to control share bylaws and other constituent documents as contracts that violate the Act no longer have a federal door.

Four things are untouched. Commission enforcement is unaffected. Section 36(b) excessive-fee claims and Section 30(h) short-swing claims remain available on their own terms, which means fee litigation must proceed inside the Section 36(b) framework rather than around it. State-law claims are not addressed by the decision, and Saba has said publicly it will pursue them. And rescission itself survives as a remedy — a litigant with an independent cause of action, whether under state law, a breach of fiduciary duty theory, or as a defense to a contract claim, may still ask a court to undo a contract, with Section 47(b) governing how the court answers.

For Maryland closed-end funds the practical result is a return to the position the Commission staff has taken since it withdrew the Boulder Total Return Fund no-action letter in 2020: opting into a state control share statute does not automatically violate Section 18(i). Funds organized as Massachusetts business trusts are in a different position, because a 2023 Suffolk County Superior Court decision holding control share bylaws inconsistent with Section 18(i) stands unaffected by a ruling about federal private rights of action.

The signal beyond the fund industry

The reasoning is not confined to the Investment Company Act. The Court applied the framework of Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), and treated the presence of an express enforcement scheme as evidence against implying another. Advisers should note in particular that Transamerica now rests on narrower ground than it did before this decision. Any claim built on an implied right of action under a federal securities statute — rather than an express one — is weaker today than it was on June 10.

The majority and dissent also divided sharply over legislative history. The dissent read the 1980 committee reports as treating a private right of action as a given; the majority answered that Congress “expresses itself as a body through the text it enacts.” Practitioners framing statutory arguments in this area should expect text and structure to carry the weight.

For fund shareholders

If you hold shares in a closed-end fund and believe its governing documents disadvantage you, this decision removes one federal route, not every route. Shareholders retain the express claims Congress wrote into the statute, including the Section 36(b) claim against an adviser for excessive compensation. State corporate law claims and ordinary shareholder remedies — voting, proxy solicitation, and board nomination — are unaffected. Conduct you believe violates the Investment Company Act can be reported to the Commission, which the decision confirms is the statute’s primary enforcer.

For more information. If you have questions about closed-end fund governance, control share provisions, or what remains available under the Investment Company Act after FS Credit, contact Evans Law, PC.

This update is general information about a regulatory development, not legal advice, and reading it creates no attorney-client relationship. Whether it applies to you depends on facts it cannot know. See our Attorney Advertising, Legal Notices & Disclaimers.

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